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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most vibrant contemporary philosophical debates concerns the 
definition, and defence, of religious pluralism. The philosophers who address such a 
topic usually hold widely divergent views regarding its exact definition and the 
arguments through which it can be upheld. The absence of a general consensus 
notwithstanding, the debate on religious pluralism has ‘de facto’ become an 
important area of dialogue between different religions in general, and between 
Christianity and Islam in particular. At stake in the present paper is the discussion 
of pluralism developed by the US-American-Persian philosopher Muhammad (Gary 
Carl) Legenhausen (b. 1953), that he presents as a criticism of the views of the late 
British theologian John Harwood Hick (1922-2012). Hick developed his views 
mainly influenced by Christianity, yet he also took into account some ideas 
advanced by Muslim authors. Legenhausen, a convert to Islam, puts forth his own 
version of pluralism in the framework of a discussion of the concept as it has 
emerged within Christianity, and advances a refutation of Hick's view 
complementary to his own theory of pluralism. The aim of the present pages is to 
offer an overview of Legenhausen’s contribution and discuss some of its possible 
implications and premises. In other words, rather than producing a defence of 
Legenhausen’s theory, this study is to analyse the logic behind and beyond his 
specific ‘Muslim proposal’ and explain what some of its unstated premises might be, 
as well as the consequences of fully embracing such stance, for philosophers, – not 
only Muslims ones –, interested in understanding religion from a religious point of 
view and in advocating that religious differences should not turn into a reason of 
animosity. The paper is divided into two main sections. The first one reconstructs 
Legenhausen's version of religious pluralism, while especially  recalling the points 
with which it is presented as clashing with Hick's one. The second section is 
dedicated to the critical assessment.  
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The overall goal towards which the reflection of the British theologian J.H. Hick strives is the 
interpretation of religion from a religious point of view, attaining a justification of religion that 
focuses upon epistemological concepts and is not bound to a specific confession. Following 
Hick's theory, the basis of religion is an experience of the divine, which he calls ‘the Real’ as well 
as ‘ultimate reality’, and defines ‘transcategorial’ as: “beyond the range of categorial systems”. 
Such experience, or encounter, is given through the human cognitive capacities and is later 
conceptualized through ideas that are culturally determined – hence the many names given in 
different cultures to the same Real. Religion as an institution, or as a corpus of doctrines, has the 
function both of a ‘constant reminder’ and of a ‘filter’ of the Real; in order to illustrate this latter 
point, Hick employs the image of a resistance in electronics (Hick 2004: xiii, xv, xix, xxi, xxv, 1, 
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11 & 163). Hick defines monotheistic creeds as post-axial religions – their emergence in his 
interpretation marked the realization not only of the existence of the Real but also of a ‘limitless 
better possibility’ disclosed to humanity, whereas pre-axial religions had rather been oriented 
to the creation of a more stable sense of life. The term ‘axial’ precisely emphasizes the re-
orientation of which consists, according to Hick, the liberation brought about by the major 
monotheistic religions. Such liberation is a transcending of the ego and the focus on humanity 
or, in other words, the shift of balance from self-centeredness to the Real; moreover, the 
emergence of post-axial religions meant, according to Hick, the exhaustive identification and 
establishment of the ways of conceiving the ultimate itself. The human beings on whose life the 
Real impinges more directly are the saints, who have (or have had) ‘powerfully invasive 
experiences’ stemming from the ultimate reality; beliefs can also be transmitted and inherited; 
therefore, more ordinary believers can be impressed by the moral and spiritual achievements of 
the saints; however, this is, according to Hick, a ‘secondary kind of religious experience’ (Hick 
1990: 53, 55 & 169; 2004: 12, 23, 28-31, 221-222, 230 & 259).  
Faith, either stemming from the direct acquaintance of the Real, or emerging as a result 
of ‘second order’ beliefs, is described by Hick as a cognitive choice: the choice to interpret the 
universe by assuming the existence and presence of God, seen as: “anti-improbability factor” 
and “. . . experiencing events in history and in our own personal life as the medium of God's 
dealings with us”. The universe per se remains, as Hick maintains, ‘stubbornly ambiguous’ and 
cognitive religious experience can well be, as Hick admits, delusive. Hence, the cognitive choice 
of faith: “. . . has some of the characteristics of a wager”. However Hick's central thesis is that it is 
rational to believe in God: “One who has a powerful and continuous sense of existing in the 
presence of God ought therefore to be convinced that God exists” (Hick 1990: 46 & 58; 2004: 86, 
104, 210, 216 & 226). According to Hick: “a viable justification of religious belief . . . leads 
inevitably to the problems of a religious pluralism”. ‘The great, postaxial world faiths’ are 
described by him as: “embody[ing]) different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly 
different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of being human . . . within each 
of them the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality is taking place”. 
Such religions have emerged as the result of: “powerfully invasive experiences setting up new 
beliefs that were not compatible with much of the individual's previous belief-system”. What can 
be said, then, about the contrasting and conflicting beliefs of different traditions? Hick classifies 
them under several categories and dismisses the idea that they constitute insurmountable 
difficulties. We have already seen that different religions basically are, as Hick defines them, 
different responses to the same noumenal dimension, and they therefore: “. . . evoke parallel 
salvific transformations of human life”. However, there are also ‘opposed historical beliefs’ that 
are at least theoretically solvable by means of historical evidence and that: “. . . should simply be 
acknowledged and tolerated”. Hick categorizes conflicts regarding beliefs about creation, 
resurrection, reincarnation, heaven and hell (among others) as ‘trans-historical’. He maintains 
that they concern questions whose answers are irrelevant for salvation/ liberation that, in any 
case, cannot be answered at the present time. The response to the inappropriateness of human 
concepts to them has been the creation of myths which, Hick asserts: “functioning in their 
separate mythic spaces, do not clash with one another” (Hick 2004: xv, 14-15, 230, 240 & 370-
371). 
One of the names of the Real that Hick lists is al-Haqq (Hick 2004: xl, 11, 48-50, 237, 
241, 373 & 378), one of the names of God in Islam. The Islamic call that: “There is no god but 
God” (la ilaha illa Allah) is listed by Hick among those primary affirmations of faith that: “. . . 
typically contain an explicit or implicit summons to respond. . .” and conflict only in the sense that: 
“. . . they are different and that one can centre one's religious life wholeheartedly and 
unambiguously upon one of them”. In opposition to the idea that pluralism is historically 
Western or Christian, Hick identifies it in the teaching of, among others, the Sufi Rumi (1207-
1273 CE) and quotes this saying: “The lamps are different but the Light is the same: it comes from 
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Beyond”. With an analogous function, Hick refers to the Sufi al Junaid (830-910 CE) who stated: 
“The colour of the water is the same as that of its container” a metaphor that well described, 
according to Hick, the way in which different religions experience and conceptualize the Real. 
Islam, Hick remarks, has no concept of salvation or of humanity's fall; however, he points out 
that it precisely distinguishes between self-surrender to God, leading to peace and the contrary 
state. In this sense Hick relates the state of Islam as parallel to Christian and Judaic salvation as 
well as to Hindu and Buddhist liberation. Hick also highlights a special awareness of the: “. . . 
transformation of human existence by the total surrender of the self to God” that he sees 
exemplified in Sufism through the concepts of dhikr or ‘God-consciousness’ and fana or: “re-
centring in God leading to ‘baqa’, human life merged into the divine life. . .”. ‘Islam’, Hick 
concludes: “is thus very clearly a form of the transformation of human existence from self-
centredness to Reality-centeredness”. As to the future of Islam, Hick states that: “Islam may be 
expected to go through essentially the same traumas as Christianity in its encounter both with 
modern science and with the emerging ecumenical outlook”; Hick identifies such ecumenical 
outlook within the Muslim world as ‘powerfully expressed’ by Sufism and therefore utters the 
hope in a full acknowledgement of it.  
Muhammad Legenhausen (1999: 27, 31-46 & 79-90; 2006: 7-8, 19-26, 29-39, 46 & 63) 
defines religious pluralism as: “. . . a doctrine according to which some sort of favourable 
attribution is ascribed to a plurality of religions”. He points out that the term in a metaphysical 
sense was first employed by the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754), that it was 
later popularized by the US-American William James (1842-1910), and that it tends to be 
confused with a term used in a political sense. Legenhausen goes on to identify at least seven 
variants of pluralism, with possible sub-variants, and conducts a historical survey aimed at 
demonstrating that: “. . . modern religious pluralism arose specifically in reaction to widespread 
Christian views about salvation”. However, it is especially in contrast with Hick's doctrines that 
Legenhausen advances his own version of pluralism. Hick is indeed presented by Legenhausen 
as the foremost advocate of reductive pluralism, i.e., of a form of pluralism that Legenhausen 
opposes. According to Legenhausen, the British theologian's proposal is mined by several 
serious difficulties. First of all, according to him, Hick's religious pluralism, while presented as a 
doctrine of toleration, is in fact a doctrine of ‘mutilation’: “. . . the advocacy of a forced doctrinal 
synthesis . . . intolerant of serious religious differences”. Secondly, Hick's doctrine, in 
Legenhausen's view, falsely considers the differences between religions as ‘doctrinal’ rather 
than “practical.” Third, Hick downplays the relevance of differences in doctrines and in so doing, 
weakens religious prescription, as Legenhausen affirms. Fourth, in Legenhausen's 
interpretation, Hick's advocacy of religious pluralism tends to lessen the importance of reason 
that is instead an important instrument in the settlement of religious disputes and, generally, in 
theological discussions. Fifth, according to Legenhausen's interpretation, Hick falsely refers to 
mysticism as a justification of belief. Finally, Hick's religious pluralism, as Legenhausen 
maintains, is rooted in political liberalism that cannot be reconciled with all world religions.  
We have already observed in some detail Hick's references to Islam. Legenhausen is 
especially critical of Hick's passage regarding the encounter of Islam and modernity (and 
possibly mediated by Sufism) that was quoted at certain length beforehand. Legenhausen 
criticizes this passage for having a patronizing tone, and he tries to undermine Hick's reference 
to Sufism and to Rumi's motto. Legenhausen does assert the validity of some ‘degenerate’ Sufi 
movements that have initiated non-Muslims, but still maintains that the ‘vast majority’ of them 
are required to embrace shari`ah prior to spiritual initiation. Furthermore, in order to water 
down the supposed pluralistic vein in Rumi's metaphor with the lamps and the light, 
Legenhausen remarks that the Qur'an does distinguish among different religions despite the 
identity of such light: “. . . rather God presents the lamps to humanity in succession and it is our 
responsibility to follow what God has assigned for us at the present age”. According to 
Legenhausen, there is only one emphatic difference between Sufism and theology with regards 
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to religious diversity, the former: “. . . emphasize the inner unity of revealed religions, while the 
theologians emphasize the outward superiority of Islam” (Legenhausen 1999: 107-110; 2006: 84, 
88 & 98).  
It is in the framework of this reconstruction of pluralism, and of the criticism of Hick's 
specific version of pluralism, that Legenhausen puts forth his own proposal that he labels as 
non-reductive. The gist of non-reductive pluralism, according to Legenhausen, is: “. . . the view 
that each of a number of religions has unique features through which God may guide people, even 
if there is no common essence to all religions”. According to Legenhausen, this version of 
pluralism: “. . . is able to avoid the objections raised against liberal or reductive pluralism while 
maintaining an attitude of tolerance and rejecting prejudice”. Non-reductive pluralism as 
Legenhausen develops it is presented by him as deeply rooted in Islam, which in turn is 
presented as essentially legalistic: “No matter how we miserably fail”, Legenhausen remarks: 
“Muslims aspire to build a society founded on the example of the Prophet's just governance in 
accordance with Divine law”. Moreover, Legenhausen points out that to have faith in the Islamic 
sense: “. . . is to be wholeheartedly committed to believe ‘in’ as well as to believe ‘that’, and to be 
ready to put one's beliefs into action”.  Therefore, according to Legenhausen, a distinction must 
be maintained between Islam and other religions, especially pre-Islamic paganism which cannot 
be described as solely one response to the Real among others. Moreover, he points out that 
accepting only some of the prophets to the exclusion of others (most notably the Prophet of 
Islam): “. . . with the excuse that it makes no difference because all religions are ultimately saying 
the same thing is to fail to heed the divine call” (Legenhausen 1999: 101 & 103; 2006: 4 & 65).  
Therefore, non-Muslim religious devotion should be interpreted as a mistake, according 
to Legenhausen (2006: 111, 115, 118, 121 & 123-128); however he adds: “Since there is no way 
for us to tell whether or not the mistake is excusable, where good relations with non-Muslims are 
possible without condoning injustice, the presumption of an ‘honest mistake’ is morally incumbent 
on us”. No attempt is therefore made to reinterpret doctrines and beliefs: “. . . to reveal some 
hidden agreement”. In sum, what Legenhausen prescribes is an admission of humility, the 
acknowledgment that we do not know how God may guide the sincere, that according to him: “. . 
. has featured prominently in the Islamic tradition”. It is also taken for granted that each believer 
considers his or her own faith tradition as the best. Legenhausen asserts that: “to defend religion 
means to support, encourage and defend the dignity of others' faiths and practices to the greatest 
extent possible” yet he immediately admits that such an approach is not ‘unlimited’ i.e. devoid of 
difficulties). Perhaps as a counterbalance to Hick's reference to Rumi, Legenhausen reports a 
story to be found in Rumi's poetry; according to this story, Moses once scolded a shepherd who 
expressed his faith in God in rather naive a way, only to be told by God in person that this form 
of worship had been accepted. Yet the story, Legenhausen points out, also recounts that Moses 
narrated to the shepherd what had happened, who in turn thanked him for prodding him to 
move to a higher form of worship.   
 
Thinking Legenhausen’s Pluralism Through 
 
I here take the act of ‘thinking through’, evoked by the title in reference to my own attitude 
towards Legenhausen’s doctrine, to mean the critical interpretation of a philosophical teaching 
according to different perspectives, and on different levels. My goal is to think through 
Legenhausen’s non-reductive pluralism especially paying attention its the broader and farthest-
reaching implications, i.e. to the stances that one should consequently and consistently assume 
towards other religions or teachings that are more sweepingly touched upon by the thinker 
while advancing his theory. To begin with, it should be remarked that apparently Legenhausen’s 
theory of pluralism is subject to diverse interpretations or evaluations, most of them 
complementary. Thus, I shall sketch a list of possible lines of investigation or assessment that 
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shall not pursued at any length on these pages, and that here are offered to my reader not only 
for completeness’ sake but also as suggestions for further investigation and reflection:  
 
 One might engage in a socio-historical reading of the emergence of Legenhausen’s teaching. The 
information provided in the preceding section and the very fact that Legenhausen’s contribution 
is quite recent render this kind of attempt premature here; furthermore, it definitely exceeds my 
own competence as a scholar. However, it seems relevant to point that the fact that theories 
blossomed over the past decades upholding religious pluralism might be considered, besides and 
beyond their specific theologico-philosophical consistency and value, as the result and 
expression of their inventors’ existential experiences linked to and rooted in social shifts 
characteristic of modernity. In other words, the urge for the development of some form of 
religious pluralism can be generally seen as a result of globalization, which rendered, at least for 
a considerable number of intellectuals, the perception of religious diversity, as well as the need 
for a pacific coexistence argued on a rational (or at least persuasive) basis, inescapable. The 
specific need, felt and expressed by a figure like Legenhausen, for a non-reductive, Muslim 
contribution (i.e. a position that is pluralistic yet at the same time quite intransigent towards 
attempts perceived by him as too weak or lenient with existing contradictions among religious 
creeds) might be explained as mirroring (or stemming from) Legenhausen’s specific condition of 
an US-American convert and academic and, what is more, immersed in the context of 
contemporary Iran.   
 One might engage in an evaluation of Legenhausen’s reading of Hick’s theory. What I have offered 
to my reader is however a simplified (or perhaps even biased) version of the British theologian’s 
doctrine, functional to the illustration of Legenhausen’s one. It can also be further discussed up to 
which extent Legenhausen’s doctrine is essentially dependent upon his own criticism of Hick’s. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that Legenhausen takes Hick’s contribution as its main polemical objective 
might be considered as a factor that bestows supplementary interest and visibility on 
Legenhausen’s one, given the predecessor’s fame and importance; and yet, if Legenhausen’s 
interpretation would be proved wrong or unsatisfactory, up to which extent would his specific 
non-reductive pluralism turn out to be weakened as to its tenets? This question is left open for 
the specialists of Hick’s theory. 
 One might undertake a theological evaluation of Legenhausen’s theory, comparing it to the 
content of relevant Qur’anic passages and trying to understand up to which extent such teaching 
can be substantiated with punctual quotations from the Revelation and, more in general, whether 
and how it can be reconciled with broader theological doctrines.    
 
As stated above, the points will not be deepened here. We might call them questions 
regarding the premises of Legenhausen’s theory – in other words, such questions touch upon all 
those elements that precede Legenhausen’s theory, in a broad sense, as factors that motivate its 
emergence or as its philosophico-theological foundations. What is at stake in what follows are 
rather what I define the implications (once again, in a broad, not exclusively or strictly logical 
sense) of Legenhausen’s teaching. What guides me in the identification of such implications is 
the following overarching question; what ideas are we bound to embrace if we, as philosophers, 
or theologians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, subscribe to such a position, beyond the specific 
rejection of Hick’s teaching? A parallel question that shall be explored is; what kind of 
philosophical style might be most congenial to a Legenhausen-inspired doctrine of religious 
pluralism? Let us start with the acceptance of the irreducible asymmetry between revelations 
and therefore between religions that, as we have seen, is at the core of Legenhausen’s position. 
This asymmetry overlaps with, or is induced by, the full acceptance of the doctrine according to 
which the revelation received by the Prophet of Islam completes and seals the previous ones. 
Such acceptance seems to entail dramatic consequences for at least three lines of reflection 
according to which theologians and philosophers have been trying to argue not only in favour of 
religious pluralism proper but also, more generally, in order to lessen the believers’ initial 
diffidence towards other creeds.  
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The first line of argumentation is the one aimed at highlighting the analogies between 
different religions; such strategy has a long and honourable history; we can for instance recall 
here the declaration Nostra Aetate, stemming from the Second Vatican Council and promulgated 
by Pope Paul VI (1965), that emphasizes the similarities between Christianity and other 
religions. One passage, about Islam, is particularly worth to be quoted at length here:  
 
The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and 
subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who 
has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable 
decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, 
submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a 
prophet. They also honour Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with 
devotion. In addition, they await the Day of Judgment when God will render their deserts 
to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and 
worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting. Since in the course of 
centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, 
this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual 
understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all 
mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom. 
 
A second, more sophisticated or academic line, is aimed at elaborating common ground 
between different religions, for instance by emphasising the analogous challenges posed to all 
religions by (a certain reading of) natural science, and therefore the analogous ways in which 
the former might cope with the latter. A third line is the one aimed at synthesizing a common 
core-creed between different religions – this is precisely the line that, at least in Legenhausen’s 
interpretation, Hick was wrongly pursuing.  
 Embracing Legenhausen’s philosophy implies, in my view, at least two main 
consequences as to such lines of thought. On the one hand, the very emergence of such 
contributions as an intellectual phenomenon should not be rejected in toto: they still might be 
seen as animated by an urge analogous to the one that motivates Legenhausen, and therefore a 
morally or practically laudable one, even if framed into what, as we have seen, Legenhausen 
calls a honest mistake. However, on the other hand, their philosophico-theological value turns 
out to be severely questioned and weakened. Legenhausen points out, as we have seen, multiple 
and irreparable asymmetries between revelations and religions, given the fact that different 
revelations have been bestowed on humanity in different times, that some teachings have been 
corrected or cancelled by successive ones, or that some pivotal figures (first and foremost 
Jesus), are characterized in deeply divergent ways. Hence, mentioning that the same narrative 
or figure occurs within all such revelations or religion (for instance Abraham, or Moses, or the 
Virgin Mary) is an important and interesting analogy to be highlighted, (especially as a 
counterbalance to the attempts, sadly very frequent in some political circles, at excessively 
‘exotifying’ other religions in order to induce feelings of fear and refusal), but such highlighting 
it is not tantamount nor conducive to the construction of a ‘common creed’, nor should it be 
used to induce the illusion thereof, or that the similarities are more relevant than the 
dissimilarities: substantial doctrinal differences exist and persist. An analogous assessment is 
obtained, in this vein, as to the second and third line of argumentation: if we adopt 
Legenhausen’s standpoint we can state that these theories just (try to) cloud the inescapable, 
essential differences between religions, and represent, at best, an expression of analytical skills 
that might be invested in the construction of more significant theologico-philosophical 
doctrines. 
 A final, but not less, relevant, question is; which philosophical style should we adopt in 
order to express a defence of religious pluralism à la Legenhausen? Indeed the US-American-
Iranian occasionally seemed to favour a ‘geometrical demonstration’ of his arguments, i.e. to 
tend to the adoption of an analytical style, he does appreciate and practice such style 
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(Legenhausen 2009: 5-42), characteristic of the form of philosophy to which he was exposed in 
the first phases of his intellectual development, yet he also states: “I still like the logic chopping 
of analytic philosophy, and its clever ways of dealing with paradoxes and quandaries. Too often, 
however, it seems to suffer from a lack of spirit, a lack of profundity, a lack of faith. Of course, there 
are exceptions; but as a rule, analytic philosophy seems to share many of the vices that pervade 
contemporary post-industrial society: over-reliance on technical expertise and over-specialisation, 
over-confidence that science can answer all the questions worth asking” (Legenhausen 2006a: 2). 
We have observed that Legenhausen is eager to recognize and make explicit the difficulties that 
his position entails, as well as to defend his version of pluralism even in a narrative, although 
essentially philosophical way, as it is the case with the above-mentioned apologue of Moses and 
the shepherd.  
 Perhaps I can sum up all the suggestions contained in the preceding pages by drawing a 
comparison between the role potentially played by Legenhausen in the contemporary debate 
over religious pluralism and the appearance, in Western philosophy, of the ideas of the ideas of 
the Danish philosopher Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855) within a philosophical landscape 
dominated by those of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). In 
nuce, Hegel conceived an interpretation of human spirit and history (the latter being considered 
as the unfolding of the former) as a process constantly shaped in a threefold abstract 
movement; thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In this process the elements of whatever is perceived 
(or initially thought of) as a contradiction or a conflict, are subsequently ‘elevated’ and 
‘conserved’ (German aufgehoben) in a superior, synthetized unity. Such logical mechanism is 
systematically identified or applied by Hegel in his interconnected interpretations of 
knowledge, history, and art.  Kierkegaard’s thought is instead centred on individual and 
existence. The latter, for the Danish author, is not an attribute of universal concepts, that are 
abstract generalizations, but rather of the single individual. The very verb ex-sistere, according 
to Kierkegaard, points at the fact that the individual out-stands, i.e. is distinguished and 
unrepeatable. Reality and singularity, in his interpretation, converge. Therefore, in 
Kierkegaard’s criticism, Hegel’s threefold ‘movement’ might well prove a fascinating intellectual 
tool for the production of all-encompassing systems; however, a single individual never 
experiences such synthesis but rather radical choices or dilemmas, that come in the form of an 
aut–aut, either-or, and where no third way or compromise is given. Furthermore, to Hegel’s 
constant emphasis on rationality and to his meticulous, analytical style Kierkegaard (who 
preferably defined himself a poet) opposed a fragmentary, poetic, and narrative form, and 
especially accentuated the treatment of feelings.  
 Analogously, I am inclined to see Legenhausen’s philosophical contribution as a clarion-
call to all the advocates of religious pluralism (broadly meant), towards which he acts in a way 
analogous to that of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to Hegelianism. Whereas he advocates practical, 
concrete pluralism, i.e. the idea according to which religious diversity should not become the 
reason for animosity, and that believers of other creeds should be considered and treated in a 
benevolent way, Legenhausen dramatically reshuffles the cards traditionally played by the 
advocates of pluralism. Similarly to Kierkegaard’s approach to life and history, Legenhausen’s 
theory does not escape from radical asymmetries: on the contrary, it emphasizes them - they 
become the cornerstone of his position. Embracing such position requires a courageous thinker 
who is not afraid to look eye-to-eye with the radical differences present in other religions, as 
well as with the contradictions, doubts, and mixed feelings apparently arising from the 
confrontation with his or her own sacred scriptures, or more in general with any opposing 
positions that arise from one’s own traditions.  
 Legenhausen’s stance, if assumed as a method rather than a specifically Muslim position, 
uncompromisingly assumes the insider view's perspective of a specific religious tradition, 
avoiding the illusion and the impression of creating a ‘synthesis’ of beliefs served to her or his 
readers in a rationalized packaging, and never forgetting radical differences in favour of 
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analogies and abstraction. Such an approach to religious pluralism is not be an Olympian, irenic 
and analytical theory, but rather a philosophy practiced with courage and self-criticism, also 
liable to be expressed in a narrative style rather than one that tailored on systematic, analytical 
philosophy. All this has far-reaching and perhaps dramatic consequences, that shall be further 
explored in detail, and that pose substantial challenges, especially for thinkers interested in the 
development of such an approach from a Jewish or Christian standpoint.  
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